The Power of Labor: Tunisia’s trade union and the Arab Spring
SEBASTIAN BENN
COMMENTARY #48 • AUGUST 2024
Introduction
The Arab Spring, which began in late 2010, was a series of anti-government protests, uprisings, and armed rebellions that spread across much of the Arab world. Sparked by the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a young street vendor in Tunisia, these movements aimed to address issues of political corruption, economic instability, and social injustice. The self-immolation, often described as the catalyst of the protests, led to widespread civil uprisings and significant political changes in multiple countries, including Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Bahrain[1].
Tunisia’s revolution was particularly noteworthy. Generally understood as the success story of the arab spring, it toppled the 23-year-old dictatorship and introduced a new and modern constitution, setting a precedent for democratic transition in the region[2]. The Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali was ousted following mass mobilizations, marking a significant victory for the people[3]. This “mythical” event demonstrated the power of collective action and the possibility of a peaceful revolution[4].
But what is it about this revolution that merits the world’s attention, even over a decade later?
The answer lies, in part, in the role played by the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT). While the dramatic images of mass protests and the toppling of dictators during the Arab Spring dominated headlines, the UGTT was a pivotal force in Tunisia’s revolution that received little attention. Amidst the chaos and clamor for change, the UGTT emerged as a key figure, politicizing the protests, orchestrating strikes, and ultimately ensuring a peaceful transition. By providing structure and leadership, the union helped to ensure that the revolutionary fervor was channeled towards constructive ends, rather than descending into anarchy. Despite its crucial role, the significance of the UGTT remains largely underappreciated in mainstream narratives.
In this article, we will explore how the UGTT’s involvement in the Tunisian Revolution offers critical insights into the dynamics of revolutionary movements. We will examine the specific actions taken by the UGTT, its internal struggles, their impact on the revolution’s outcomes, and what this reveals about the role of organized labor in times of political upheaval. Through this analysis, we aim to highlight why a robust labor movement was in this case essential for the success of the revolutionary movement.
The Context Pre-Arab Spring: Rising discontent
Before delving into the pivotal role of the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) during the Arab Spring, it is crucial to understand the political landscape and socio-economic conditions that led to the widespread discontent and eventual uprising.
Tunisia, under President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, was a society dominated by a privileged class. The regime’s corrupt practices and authoritarian rule were widely criticized. In a June 2008 report, the U.S. ambassador to Tunisia described the Ben Ali regime as a “quasi-mafia” and, a top-secret report uncovered by Wikileaks noted the pervasive corruption and the misuse of the justice system to prosecute political opponents, trade unionists, students, journalists, and human rights defenders. In many neighborhoods, Ben Ali’s agents spied on the population using what the regime called “neighborhood committees” [5]. This political situation—marked by a lack of democratic freedoms and accountability—fueled public anger.
The effects of neoliberalism since the 1980s, including Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Plans (ERSAP), led to the dismantling of the developmentalist state and the unraveling of the social contract between the population and the state. These reforms, which included privatization of public sector companies, deregulation of the labor market, and opening up markets to foreign investments, resulted in high unemployment, and increased economic inequality. The ruling elite, including the president and his family, directly benefited from these measures, further alienating them from the population[6]. The Internet revealed the degree of luxury in which the privileged members of the regime lived—villas, private jets, palaces, luxury cars, private clubs, and bank accounts in Tunisia and abroad—deepening feelings of hatred among Tunisian youth toward their rulers[7]. Additionally, unemployment was especially high among the youth and educated professionals. In 2010, 42 percent of Tunisians were under twenty-five, and even the educated youth were left without any future prospects. According to a World Bank report, unemployment was on the rise even among university graduates, with youth unemployment being estimated at between 40 and 60 percent for 2009 graduates[8].
The discrepancy between the President’s liberal-democratic rhetoric and the political reality, along with the artificially cultivated national Tunisian patriotism, led to a significant erosion of ideological legitimacy. This ideological void contributed to feelings of humiliation and the demands for “national dignity” and “justice” [9]. The absence of clear mechanisms for the transfer of power within the authoritarian regime made it vulnerable to revolution[10].
The global economic crisis of 2008–2011 and the resulting agflation wave, which led to a steep rise in global food prices, added to the fire. This economic strain, combined with the high degree of economic inequality, pushed a mass of lower-class Arabs, along with highly educated but unsettled youth, to join the protests[11]. The self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, driven by economic desperation and humiliation, became a powerful symbol of the broader societal grievances and sparked the widespread protests that led to the Arab Spring[12].
The Gafsa Mining Protests: A Prelude to Revolution
In 2008, the town of Redeyef became the epicenter of a major uprising. The Gafsa Mining Company, the primary employer in the region, had been in decline for years, leading to massive layoffs and soaring unemployment rates. In some areas, unemployment reached between 20 and 39 percent, with 40 percent of the population living below the poverty line. The following protests included demonstrations, sit-ins, marches, and clashes with police, lasting for six months. These events were marked by a high level of participation from the unemployed, students, and their families[13](Meijer, 2016). Although the Gafsa protests did not receive broad public support at the time, they revealed significant weaknesses in the ruling regime. The harsh response from security forces, including the use of water cannons and live ammunition, exposed the regime’s inability to engage in dialogue and its reliance on repression. Following the Gafsa protests, there was a noticeable rise in cultural expressions of public discontent, such as theatrical performances, rap music, and increased violence at football matches. These cultural forms of protest reflected the growing frustration and anger toward the government and contributed to the overall atmosphere of dissent[14] . Having learned from these protests, trade unionists in 2010 decided to immediately organize support demonstrations in other regions following Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation. The Gafsa protests can be understood as a “dress rehearsal” for the broader revolution that would erupt in 2010[15].
The next section will delve into the specific actions taken by the Tunisian General Trade Union and how they emerged as a key actor during the revolution.
The UGTT: Tunisia’s Labor Union
The Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT) stands out as an influential force in Tunisia’s political landscape. Founded in 1946 the UGTT already played a pivotal role in the country’s anti-colonial struggle and has been central to Tunisian political life ever since. With a membership of 750,000, the UGTT is the largest national organization in Tunisia. It encompasses 24 regional unions, 19 sector-based unions, and 21 grassroots unions. The organization includes a wide range of members from different social groups and political persuasions, such as factory workers, civil servants, doctors, and more. The UGTT has a centralized hierarchical structure with four levels: local, regional, federal, and national. This structure ensures a network that spans the entire country, with the National Congress, the union’s highest body, electing the national executive committee and the secretary general[16].
The UGTT’s history is marked by its complex relationship with the Tunisian state, characterized by an “unstable cohabitation between a neutralized leadership and an uncontrolled base”[17]. On the one hand, the union’s deep roots and its network of local and regional sections across the country have enabled it to maintain close ties with the working class, ensuring it remained a potent force in Tunisian politics. It was able to negotiate collective agreements for its members, defended workers’ interests, and consistently opposed the government’s capitalist policies[18]. On the other hand, many of the high positions in the union were beneficiaries of Ben Ali’s regime. In fact, the collaboration of the national labor leaders with Ben Ali’s government was a key issue. Many of these leaders had enjoyed extra income and privileges, such as gifts of money, land grants, and employment for their children in prominent positions. This collaboration was evident when the UGTT’s secretary-general, Abdessalem Jrad, met with Ben Ali at the beginning of the protests to assure the regime of the union’s support, ignoring the widespread opposition among the union’s members[19]. While leaders like Bourguiba and Ben Ali sought to co-opt the union to consolidate their power, the UGTT maintained a delicate balance between submission and resistance. This balance allowed the union to retain a degree of independence uncommon among Arab labor unions[20]. This balance has enabled the UGTT to act as a figure of resistance against the ruling party[21].
The early days of the Tunisian Revolution saw significant internal struggles within the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT), as discrepancies emerged between the local unionists and the national leadership[22].
The unionists from the base and intermediate branches adapted their strategy in response to the regime’s rising violence, which led to a swell in the uprising. They wanted to change the leadership’s wait-and-see attitude, which had only offered little support for the movements in Sidi Bouzid, Kasserine, and Thala. This internal pressure created a crisis within the UGTT, which broke with the conventional decision-making processes and local unionists started to disregard the central hierarchy. The regional unions began to act independently, ignoring the legal requirements for prior approval and notice to strike. This shift from mediation to confrontation was critical in the union’s evolving role in the revolution[23].
The position of the UGTT’s leadership remained uncertain until January 8, 2011. This date marks a significant turning point when snipers killed demonstrators in Kasserine. This brutal repression prompted the union’s leadership to oppose the use of force against protesters. Gradually, the UGTT leadership began to support the general revolt against Ben Ali, authorizing strikes at the local level[24].
Faced with the escalating violence and the death of hundreds of civilians, the UGTT Executive Board and Secretary General had no choice but to support the protest movements. Failing to do so would have resulted in a loss of legitimacy in the eyes of their base and the broader Tunisian populace, who were deeply moved by the tragic events. The unionists succeeded in pushing the Executive Board via the Administrative Commission to adopt a more offensive stance in support of the protesters and their demands[25].
On January 11, 2011, the UGTT Administrative Commission issued a statement allowing local unions across the country the freedom to call regional and sectoral strikes. This decision led to general strikes in Sfax, Tozeur, and Kairouan on January 12, 2011. The violently suppressed uprising evolved into a revolutionary process as the UGTT’s local and regional branches fully embraced the cause[26].
The role of the UGTT: From spontaneous protests to revolutionary movement
The UGTT guided the movement through three key actions: politicizing the movement, coordinating between different networks of activists, and mediating with union leaders and political authorities. Unionists emphasized their roles in politicizing the uprising by linking social and economic demands with political aims, helping to give a political purpose to the protests that were otherwise born from anger and frustration. The UGTT’s role in coordinating demonstrations was crucial. The union served as a communication hub, bringing together human rights activists, lawyers, and young unemployed people. Negotiating relationships between different parts of the protest movement was instrumental. The unionists, leveraging their experience and organizational skills, formed alliances between traditional activist networks and marginalized young people. This role helped transform the riots into a revolutionary process, blending demands for democracy and social justice and uniting various social and professional groups against the authoritarian regime[27].
One of the UGTT’s key contributions was its ability to facilitate the rapid spread of protests. The local union branches and their backing were crucial in extending demonstrations to new locations. Unionists reached out to contacts in neighboring towns, helping to diffuse pressure on hot spots like Sidi Bouzid. This widespread mobilization was a new development, distinguishing the Tunisian revolution from previous localized movements, such as the Gafsa uprisings two years earlier[28] . The 2008 worker unrest in Gafsa failed to garner broad public support and ignite protests in neighboring regions. In stark contrast, by 2010, local union activists had learned from previous mistakes and alliances had been formed. By then the networks, built in prior movements, were reactivated and the union workers actively bridged regional divides to facilitate a more coordinated movement[29].
In regions like Sidi Bouzid, Kasserine, Gafsa, and Kebili, trade unionists mentored young people and provided political direction to the burgeoning social movement. The politicized elements within the union’s left wing, including Marxists and Arab nationalists, guided residents and students[30]. The local and regional offices of the UGTT became organization centers for the revolutionaries, with activists gathering there and demonstrations often starting from these premises[31]. From the start local UGTT spaces became physical refuges where activists could find shelter and engage in political expression, free from the regime’s domination. The UGTT’s headquarters at Mohamed Ali Square in Tunis would later become a focal point for major demonstrations[32].
As Yousfi writes: “The events that led to the downfall of the Ben Ali regime originated in the offices of the UGTT.” (Yousfi, 2023)
The union’s alignment with the revolution was almost natural, as the primary demands of the masses—jobs, national dignity, and freedom—had always been central to the UGTT’s agenda. The union’s strong presence in remote areas like Sidi Bouzid and Kasserine, where the revolution began, allowed it to frame spontaneous events into organized actions[33]. Immediately following the uprisings in Sidi Bouzid on December 17, 2010, the local and regional union offices began organizing solidarity demonstrations across the region. These protests quickly spread to Tunis, where a lawyers’ sit-in was held on December 25, followed by peaceful solidarity marches in Thala[34].
Many more demonstrations, strikes, and protests were held in the following weeks. As the protests escalated and grew, increasing numbers of government functionaries began to withdraw their support for President Ben Ali, leaving him increasingly isolated. Even the police occasionally refused to open fire on the demonstrators, and government officials were unwilling to bear the responsibility for the ensuing bloodshed[35].
The UGTT took on a particularly significant role in the major demonstrations on January 12, 13, and 14, in the cities of Sfax, Gabes, Kairouan, and the capital Tunis, where it all came to a climax on the 14th of January, 2011[36]. The protest of that day was a fateful moment in Tunisian history. The regional union in Tunis organized a two-hour general strike, culminating in a massive demonstration. Hundreds of thousands marched from Mohamed Ali Square to Avenue Bourguiba, demanding Ben Ali’s resignation.
On that evening Ben Ali, who had been the autocratic ruler over Tunisia for the past 23 years, fled to Saudi Arabia[37].
Towards a new constitution
Tunisia continued to face significant social and political challenges after the fall of Ben Ali, with ongoing protests and strikes in various regions. However, the UGTT played a crucial role in facilitating a peaceful transition. In response to rising violence and political infighting, the UGTT, along with other major civil society groups, formed the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet. This coalition guided the Ennahda-led Constituent Assembly, negotiating compromises necessary to complete its work[38]. Their efforts led to the successful adoption of Tunisia’s first democratic constitution on January 26, 2014, and new elections in 2014, marking a significant milestone in the country’s transition to democracy[39].
The national dialogue and mediation by the UGTT were critical in navigating the political crises and ensuring the adoption of the new constitution[40]. The efforts of the National Dialogue Quartet were internationally recognized when they were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2015 for their decisive contribution to building a pluralistic democracy in Tunisia[41].
Unfortunately, since 2015, the democratic process has stalled[42]. Despite significant achievements, such as drafting the new constitution, holding free elections, and fostering a vibrant civil society, Tunisia has struggled to address core issues like corruption, unemployment, and socioeconomic disparities. These unresolved challenges fueled public frustration, which President Kais Saied leveraged in July 2021 to stage a self-coup. Within ten months, Saied had reversed many of Tunisia’s democratic gains by invalidating the 2014 Constitution, dissolving parliament, dismantling the Supreme Judicial Council, and making politically motivated arrests. Also, the UGTT itself has gradually lost touch with the revolutionary elements from outside the trade union. It missed the opportunity to develop a new vision based on social justice and instead became deeply involved in political struggles with the Islamist party Ennahda[43]. As Tunisia stands today, the promise of the Arab Spring remains unfulfilled, with the country facing a precarious future for its democracy[44].
In conclusion, the Tunisian Revolution was the result of political repression, economic hardship, social inequality, and ideological disillusionment. The full support of the UGTT with the demonstrations was not immediate; it was a process until the union and the revolutionary movement gradually came together. However, the alignment of the UGTT with the protestors was almost logical, as these widespread grievances had in some ways always been on the agenda of the organization[45]. The guidance of the union helped transform spontaneous protests into a cohesive movement, which managed to overthrow a dictatorship and introduce a progressive constitution.
Labor and Revolutions
As we have seen in the case of the Tunisian revolution, socio-economic conditions and political repression led to widespread anger and frustration with the political elites. It was the local unionists who understood this discontent, picked up the loose ends, and politicized the protests, transforming them into a revolutionary movement. The strength of the grassroots levels of the organization was formidable enough to overturn the leadership’s government-accepting stance. With their strategic mobilization and persistence, they were able to channel the collective frustration into a force capable of bringing about significant political change.
Some scholars in the past have suggested that collective labor organizations have become irrelevant in the information age, citing declining union membership and the impacts of global capitalism as evidence[46]. However, this perspective fails to recognize the vital role that labor unions play in global networks of activism and political struggles, particularly in the Global South. As we have seen, in Tunisia, both traditional unions together with other networks spearheaded national and social struggles, underscoring the enduring relevance of class and labor politics in these movements[47].
Egypt presents another example of the critical role of labor movements in revolutionary contexts. Egyptian trade unions, although not as centrally organized as the UGTT, were active during the uprisings that led to the ousting of President Hosni Mubarak. Like their Tunisian counterparts, Egyptian trade unionists played a vital role in maintaining momentum and organizing workers[48].
In a broader historical context, labor movements have often been at the forefront of revolutionary uprisings. In South Africa, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) was a pivotal player in the anti-apartheid movement[49]. In Brazil, the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) emerged from the labor movement, significantly influencing the country’s political landscape[50]. Similarly, in Iran, labor movements were integral to the revolutionary process during the 1980s[51].
In conclusion, labor movements have been, and continue to be, critical actors in revolutionary processes and political transformations. They embody the class struggles that drive many uprisings and have played essential roles in negotiating and shaping the outcomes of these movements. While the contexts and outcomes vary, labor politics in revolutions remains an important angle from which we can understand revolutionary uprisings.
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[2] Elfatih A Abdel Salam, “The Arab Spring: Its Origins, Evolution and Consequences… Four Years On” 23, no. 1 (2015).
[3] Ian M. Hartshorn, “Labor’s Role in the Arab Uprisings and Beyond,” Current History 115, no. 785 (December 1, 2016): 349–54, https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.2016.115.785.349.
[4] Yousfi, “Organization and Organizing in Revolutionary Times.”
[5] Amira Aleya-Sghaier, “The Tunisian Revolution: The Revolution of Dignity,” The Journal of the Middle East and Africa 3, no. 1 (January 2012): 18–45, https://doi.org/10.1080/21520844.2012.675545.
[6] Roel Meijer, “The Workers’ Movement and the Arab Uprisings,” International Review of Social History 61, no. 3 (December 2016): 487–503, https://doi.org/10.1017/S002085901600050X.
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[8] Aleya-Sghaier.
[9] Vasily Kuznetsov, ed., “The Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia and the Birth of the Arab Spring Uprisings,” in Handbook of Revolutions in the 21st Century: The New Waves of Revolutions, and the Causes and Effects of Disruptive Political Change, Societies and Political Orders in Transition (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86468-2.
[10] Grinin and Korotayev, “The Arab Spring: Causes, Conditions, and Driving Forces.”
[11] Grinin and Korotayev.
[12] Yousfi, “Organization and Organizing in Revolutionary Times.”
[13] Meijer, “The Workers’ Movement and the Arab Uprisings.”
[14] Kuznetsov, “The Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia and the Birth of the Arab Spring Uprisings.”
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[18] Meijer.
[19] Aleya-Sghaier, “The Tunisian Revolution.”
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[21] Mohamed-Salah Omri, “No Ordinary Union: UGTT and the Tunisian Path to Revolution and Transition” (University of Oxford, 2015).
[22] Yousfi, “Organization and Organizing in Revolutionary Times.”
[23] Yousfi.
[24] Kuznetsov, “The Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia and the Birth of the Arab Spring Uprisings.”
[25] Yousfi, “Organization and Organizing in Revolutionary Times.”
[26] Yousfi.
[27] Yousfi.
[28] Yousfi.
[29] Meijer, “The Workers’ Movement and the Arab Uprisings.”
[30] Aleya-Sghaier, “The Tunisian Revolution.”
[31] Aleya-Sghaier.
[32] Yousfi, “Organization and Organizing in Revolutionary Times.”
[33] Omri, “No Ordinary Union: UGTT and the Tunisian Path to Revolution and Transition.”
[34] Meijer, “The Workers’ Movement and the Arab Uprisings.”
[35] Kuznetsov, “The Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia and the Birth of the Arab Spring Uprisings.”
[36] Aleya-Sghaier, “The Tunisian Revolution.”
[37] Yousfi, “Organization and Organizing in Revolutionary Times.”
[38] Meijer, “The Workers’ Movement and the Arab Uprisings.”
[39] Kuznetsov, “The Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia and the Birth of the Arab Spring Uprisings”; Hartshorn, “Labor’s Role in the Arab Uprisings and Beyond.”
[40] Hela Yousfi, Trade Unions and Arab Revolutions: The Tunisian Case of UGTT, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2017), https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315313610.
[41] Kuznetsov, “The Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia and the Birth of the Arab Spring Uprisings.”
[42] Dokhi Fassihian, “Democratic Backsliding in Tunisia:,” Freedom House, Polcy Brief, September 2018, https://freedomhouse.org/report/policy-brief/2018/democratic-backsliding-tunisia-case-renewed-international-attention.
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[47] Yousfi, “Organization and Organizing in Revolutionary Times.”
[48] Hartshorn, “Labor’s Role in the Arab Uprisings and Beyond.”
[49] Jeremy Baskin, Striking Back: A History of Cosatu (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1991).
[50] John A Guidry, “Not Just Another Labor Party,” Labor Studies Journal Vol. 28, no. No. 1 (2003): 83–108.
[51] Asef Bayat, “Workless Revolutionaries: The Unemployed Movement in Revolutionary Iran,” International Review of Social History42, no. 2 (August 1997): 159–85, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020859000114877.